What it does. Collect volatile forensic evidence from a compromised host by following the order of volatility, preserving memory, network connections, running processes, and system state with documented chain of custody before they are lost. Use before isolating, shutting down, or remediating a compromised host, especially when fileless or memory-resident malware is suspected, root cause analysis is needed, or the evidence must hold up in legal proceedings. Part of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills (817 security skills) (mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills).
Install
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host, or copy the skill folder into ~/.claude/skills/collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host/.- Raw file:
curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/HEAD/skills/collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host/SKILL.md
SKILL.md (verbatim)
name: collecting-volatile-evidence-from-compromised-host
description: Collect volatile forensic evidence from a compromised host by following the order of volatility, preserving memory, network connections, running processes, and system state with documented chain of custody before they are lost. Use before isolating, shutting down, or remediating a compromised host, especially when fileless or memory-resident malware is suspected, root cause analysis is needed, or the evidence must hold up in legal proceedings.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: incident-response
tags:
- incident-response
- dfir
- forensics
- volatile-evidence
- memory-forensics
- chain-of-custody
mitre_attack:
- T1059.001
- T1057
- T1049
- T1003.001
- T1543.003
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- RS.MA-01
- RS.MA-02
- RS.AN-03
- RC.RP-01
Collecting Volatile Evidence from Compromised Hosts
When to Use
- Security incident confirmed and compromised host identified
- Before system isolation, shutdown, or remediation begins
- Memory-resident malware suspected (fileless attacks)
- Need to capture network connections, running processes, and system state
- Legal proceedings may require forensic evidence preservation
- Incident requires root cause analysis with volatile data
Prerequisites
- Forensic collection toolkit on USB or network share (trusted tools)
- WinPmem/LiME for memory acquisition
- Write-blocker or forensic workstation for disk imaging
- Chain of custody documentation forms
- Secure evidence storage with integrity verification
- Authorization to collect evidence (legal/HR approval for insider cases)
Workflow
Step 1: Prepare Collection Environment
# Mount forensic USB toolkit (do NOT install tools on compromised system)
# Verify toolkit integrity
sha256sum /mnt/forensic_usb/tools/* > /tmp/toolkit_hashes.txt
diff /mnt/forensic_usb/tools/known_good_hashes.txt /tmp/toolkit_hashes.txt
# Create evidence output directory with timestamps
EVIDENCE_DIR="/mnt/evidence/$(hostname)_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)"
mkdir -p "$EVIDENCE_DIR"
echo "Collection started: $(date -u)" > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/collection_log.txt"
echo "Collector: $(whoami)" >> "$EVIDENCE_DIR/collection_log.txt"
echo "System: $(hostname)" >> "$EVIDENCE_DIR/collection_log.txt"
Step 2: Capture System Memory (Highest Volatility)
# Windows - WinPmem memory acquisition
winpmem_mini_x64.exe "$EVIDENCE_DIR\memdump_$(hostname).raw"
# Linux - LiME kernel module for memory acquisition
insmod /mnt/forensic_usb/lime.ko "path=$EVIDENCE_DIR/memdump_$(hostname).lime format=lime"
# Linux - Alternative using /proc/kcore
dd if=/proc/kcore of="$EVIDENCE_DIR/kcore_dump.raw" bs=1M
# macOS - osxpmem
osxpmem -o "$EVIDENCE_DIR/memdump_$(hostname).aff4"
# Hash the memory dump immediately
sha256sum "$EVIDENCE_DIR/memdump_"* > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/memory_hash.sha256"
Step 3: Capture Network State
# Active network connections
# Windows
netstat -anob > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/netstat_connections.txt" 2>&1
Get-NetTCPConnection | Export-Csv "$EVIDENCE_DIR/tcp_connections.csv" -NoTypeInformation
Get-NetUDPEndpoint | Export-Csv "$EVIDENCE_DIR/udp_endpoints.csv" -NoTypeInformation
# Linux
ss -tulnp > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/socket_stats.txt"
netstat -anp > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/netstat_all.txt" 2>/dev/null
cat /proc/net/tcp > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_net_tcp.txt"
cat /proc/net/udp > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_net_udp.txt"
# ARP cache
arp -a > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/arp_cache.txt"
# Routing table
route print > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/routing_table.txt" # Windows
ip route show > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/routing_table.txt" # Linux
# DNS cache
ipconfig /displaydns > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/dns_cache.txt" # Windows
# Linux: varies by resolver, check systemd-resolve or nscd
systemd-resolve --statistics > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/dns_stats.txt" 2>/dev/null
# Active firewall rules
netsh advfirewall show allprofiles > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/firewall_rules.txt" # Windows
iptables -L -n -v > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/iptables_rules.txt" # Linux
Step 4: Capture Running Processes
# Windows - Detailed process list
tasklist /V /FO CSV > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/process_list_verbose.csv"
wmic process list full > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/wmic_process_full.txt"
Get-Process | Select-Object Id,ProcessName,Path,StartTime,CPU,WorkingSet |
Export-Csv "$EVIDENCE_DIR/ps_processes.csv" -NoTypeInformation
# Windows - Process with command line and parent
wmic process get ProcessId,Name,CommandLine,ParentProcessId,ExecutablePath /FORMAT:CSV > \
"$EVIDENCE_DIR/process_commandlines.csv"
# Linux - Full process tree
ps auxwwf > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/process_tree.txt"
ps -eo pid,ppid,user,args --forest > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/process_forest.txt"
cat /proc/*/cmdline 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' ' ' > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_cmdline_all.txt"
# Process modules/DLLs loaded
# Windows
listdlls.exe -accepteula > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/loaded_dlls.txt"
# Linux
for pid in $(ls /proc/ | grep -E '^[0-9]+$'); do
echo "=== PID $pid ===" >> "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_maps.txt"
cat "/proc/$pid/maps" 2>/dev/null >> "$EVIDENCE_DIR/proc_maps.txt"
done
# Open file handles
handle.exe -accepteula > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/open_handles.txt" # Windows (Sysinternals)
lsof > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/open_files.txt" # Linux
Step 5: Capture Logged-in Users and Sessions
# Windows
query user > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/logged_in_users.txt"
query session > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/active_sessions.txt"
net session > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/net_sessions.txt" 2>&1
net use > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/mapped_drives.txt" 2>&1
# Linux
who > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/who_output.txt"
w > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/w_output.txt"
last -50 > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/last_logins.txt"
lastlog > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/lastlog.txt"
cat /var/log/auth.log | tail -200 > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/recent_auth.txt" 2>/dev/null
Step 6: Capture System Configuration State
# System time (critical for timeline)
date -u > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/system_time_utc.txt"
w32tm /query /status > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/ntp_status.txt" # Windows
ntpq -p > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/ntp_status.txt" # Linux
# Environment variables
set > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/environment_vars.txt" # Windows
env > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/environment_vars.txt" # Linux
# Scheduled tasks / Cron jobs
schtasks /query /fo CSV /v > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/scheduled_tasks.csv" # Windows
crontab -l > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/crontab_current.txt" 2>/dev/null # Linux
ls -la /etc/cron.* > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/cron_dirs.txt" 2>/dev/null
# Services
sc queryex type=service state=all > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/services_all.txt" # Windows
systemctl list-units --type=service --all > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/systemd_services.txt" # Linux
# Windows Registry - key autostart locations
reg export "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/reg_run_hklm.reg" /y
reg export "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/reg_run_hkcu.reg" /y
reg export "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services" "$EVIDENCE_DIR/reg_services.reg" /y
Step 7: Hash All Evidence and Document Chain of Custody
# Generate SHA256 hashes for all collected evidence
cd "$EVIDENCE_DIR"
sha256sum * > evidence_manifest.sha256
# Create chain of custody record
cat > "$EVIDENCE_DIR/chain_of_custody.txt" << EOF
CHAIN OF CUSTODY RECORD
========================
Case ID: IR-YYYY-NNN
Collection Date: $(date -u)
Collected By: $(whoami)
System: $(hostname)
System IP: $(hostname -I 2>/dev/null || ipconfig | grep IPv4)
Collection Method: Live forensic collection via trusted USB toolkit
Evidence Items:
$(ls -la "$EVIDENCE_DIR/" | grep -v chain_of_custody)
SHA256 Manifest: evidence_manifest.sha256
Transfer: [TO BE COMPLETED]
Storage Location: [TO BE COMPLETED]
EOF
Key Concepts
| Concept |
Description |
| Order of Volatility |
RFC 3227 - Collect most volatile data first: registers > cache > memory > disk |
| Live Forensics |
Collecting evidence from a running system before shutdown |
| Chain of Custody |
Documentation tracking evidence handling from collection to court |
| Forensic Soundness |
Ensuring evidence collection doesn't alter the original evidence |
| Trusted Tools |
Using verified tools from external media, not from the compromised system |
| Evidence Integrity |
SHA256 hashing of all evidence immediately after collection |
| Locard's Exchange Principle |
Every contact leaves a trace - minimize investigator artifacts |
| Tool |
Purpose |
| WinPmem |
Windows memory acquisition |
| LiME (Linux Memory Extractor) |
Linux kernel memory acquisition |
| Sysinternals Suite |
Process, handle, and DLL analysis (Windows) |
| Velociraptor |
Remote forensic collection at scale |
| KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser) |
Automated artifact collection on Windows |
| CyLR |
Cross-platform live response collection |
| GRR Rapid Response |
Remote live forensics framework |
Common Scenarios
- Fileless Malware Attack: PowerShell-based attack with no files on disk. Memory dump is critical evidence containing the malicious scripts.
- Active C2 Session: Attacker has live connection. Network connections and process data reveal C2 infrastructure.
- Insider Data Theft: Employee copying files. Process list, mapped drives, and network connections show exfiltration activity.
- Compromised Web Server: Web shell detected. Memory may contain additional backdoors not yet written to disk.
- Lateral Movement in Progress: Attacker moving between systems. Authentication tokens and network sessions in memory reveal scope.
- Memory dump file (.raw or .lime format) with SHA256 hash
- Network state captures (connections, ARP, DNS, routes)
- Process listings with command lines and parent processes
- User session and authentication data
- System configuration snapshots
- Evidence manifest with SHA256 checksums
- Chain of custody documentation
Other files in this skill
assets/template.md (verbatim)
Volatile Evidence Collection Report
| Field |
Value |
| Case ID |
|
| System Hostname |
|
| System IP Address |
|
| System OS |
|
| Collection Date/Time (UTC) |
|
| Collector Name |
|
| Authorization |
[IR Plan / Legal Hold / HR Approval] |
Collection Summary
| Evidence Category |
Items Collected |
Status |
| Memory Dump |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| Network Connections |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| ARP Cache |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| DNS Cache |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| Routing Table |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| Running Processes |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| Open File Handles |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| Logged-in Users |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| System Configuration |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| Services |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| Scheduled Tasks |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
| Registry/Config |
|
Collected/Failed/Skipped |
Evidence Manifest
| Filename |
SHA256 Hash |
Size |
Category |
|
|
|
|
Chain of Custody
| Date/Time (UTC) |
Action |
Person |
Notes |
|
Evidence collected from live system |
|
|
|
Evidence transferred to forensic storage |
|
|
|
Evidence hash verified |
|
|
|
Evidence accessed for analysis |
|
|
System Time Verification
| Field |
Value |
| System Clock (UTC) |
|
| Reference Time (UTC) |
|
| Time Offset |
|
| NTP Synchronized |
Yes/No |
| NTP Server |
|
Notable Findings During Collection
[Any suspicious processes, connections, or artifacts noted during collection]
| Tool |
Version |
Source |
SHA256 Hash |
|
|
|
|
Collector Certification
I certify that the evidence described above was collected using forensically sound methods, from external trusted tools, and that all evidence was hashed immediately upon collection.
| Field |
Value |
| Collector Name |
|
| Collector Title |
|
| Date |
|
| Signature |
|
references/api-reference.md (verbatim)
API Reference: Collecting Volatile Evidence from Compromised Host
RFC 3227 Order of Volatility
| Priority |
Source |
Persistence |
| 1 |
CPU registers, cache |
Nanoseconds |
| 2 |
Physical memory (RAM) |
Power cycle |
| 3 |
Network state |
Seconds-minutes |
| 4 |
Running processes |
Minutes |
| 5 |
Disk (filesystem) |
Persistent |
| 6 |
Remote logging / monitoring |
Persistent |
| 7 |
Physical configuration |
Persistent |
| 8 |
Archival media |
Long-term |
| Tool |
Platform |
Command |
| AVML |
Linux |
avml /path/to/output.lime |
| WinPmem |
Windows |
winpmem_mini_x64.exe output.raw |
| LiME |
Linux |
insmod lime.ko "path=/tmp/mem.lime format=lime" |
| Magnet RAM Capture |
Windows |
GUI-based acquisition |
Linux Collection Commands
# Network connections
ss -tunap > /evidence/netstat.txt
# Process list with tree
ps auxwwf > /evidence/processes.txt
# Open files
lsof -nP > /evidence/open_files.txt
# Network config
ip addr show > /evidence/ifconfig.txt
ip route show > /evidence/routes.txt
ip neigh show > /evidence/arp.txt
# Logged-in users
w > /evidence/users.txt
last -50 > /evidence/last_logins.txt
# Cron jobs
crontab -l > /evidence/crontab.txt
ls -la /etc/cron.d/ >> /evidence/crontab.txt
Windows Collection Commands
:: Network connections
netstat -anob > C:\evidence\netstat.txt
:: Process list
tasklist /V /FO CSV > C:\evidence\processes.csv
wmic process get ProcessId,Name,CommandLine /format:csv > C:\evidence\wmic_procs.csv
:: Network config
ipconfig /all > C:\evidence\ipconfig.txt
route print > C:\evidence\routes.txt
arp -a > C:\evidence\arp.txt
:: DNS cache
ipconfig /displaydns > C:\evidence\dns_cache.txt
:: Scheduled tasks
schtasks /query /FO CSV /V > C:\evidence\schtasks.csv
:: Logged-in users
query user > C:\evidence\users.txt
Evidence Integrity
# Hash collected files
sha256sum /evidence/*.txt > /evidence/checksums.sha256
# Verify later
sha256sum -c /evidence/checksums.sha256
references/standards.md (verbatim)
Standards and Framework References - Volatile Evidence Collection
RFC 3227 - Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving
- Defines the order of volatility for digital evidence:
- Registers, cache
- Routing table, ARP cache, process table, kernel statistics, memory
- Temporary file systems
- Disk
- Remote logging and monitoring data
- Physical configuration, network topology
- Archival media
- Key principles: minimize data alteration, document actions, use trusted tools
- Reference: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3227
NIST SP 800-86 - Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques
- Section 4: Using Data from Data Sources
- 4.2: Data Files - Volatile and non-volatile OS data
- 4.3: Operating System Data - Memory, processes, network connections
- Forensic process: Collection, Examination, Analysis, Reporting
- Emphasis on preserving data integrity through proper acquisition
- Reference: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/86/final
NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 - Evidence Handling
- Respond (RS) function alignment:
- RS.AN-03: Analysis to establish incident scope
- Evidence must be collected in a forensically sound manner
- Document all collection activities and maintain chain of custody
SANS DFIR - Live Evidence Collection Best Practices
- Collect evidence from most volatile to least volatile
- Use external trusted tools (not tools from compromised system)
- Hash all evidence immediately after collection
- Document system time offset from UTC
- Minimize footprint on compromised system
- Reference: https://www.sans.org/white-papers/
MITRE ATT&CK - Evidence Sources for Detection
| Data Source |
ATT&CK Reference |
Evidence Type |
| Process (DS0009) |
Process creation, command line |
Running processes |
| Network Traffic (DS0029) |
Connection creation, flow |
Network connections |
| File (DS0022) |
File creation, modification |
Open handles, temp files |
| Windows Registry (DS0024) |
Registry key modification |
Autostart entries |
| Logon Session (DS0028) |
Logon creation |
Active user sessions |
| Module (DS0011) |
Module load |
Loaded DLLs/shared objects |
ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence
- Principle 1: No action should change data on digital devices
- Principle 2: Competent person must access original data when necessary
- Principle 3: Audit trail of all processes applied to evidence
- Principle 4: Person in charge ensures law and principles are adhered to
ISO/IEC 27037 - Guidelines for Identification, Collection, Acquisition, and Preservation
- Defines procedures for handling digital evidence
- Specifies requirements for first responders and forensic specialists
- Covers volatile and non-volatile evidence acquisition
- Emphasizes competency of evidence handlers
SWGDE Best Practices for Computer Forensics
- Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence
- Standards for evidence acquisition, examination, and reporting
- Quality assurance requirements for forensic processes
references/workflows.md (verbatim)
Volatile Evidence Collection - Detailed Workflow
Order of Volatility Collection Sequence
Priority 1: Memory (Most Volatile) - Collect First
- Connect forensic USB with memory acquisition tool
- Run memory dump tool from USB (NOT from compromised disk)
- Save memory image to external storage
- Record start time, end time, and memory size
- Generate SHA256 hash of memory image immediately
- Document any errors during acquisition
Priority 2: Network State
- Capture all active TCP/UDP connections with process IDs
- Capture ARP cache (maps IP to MAC addresses)
- Capture DNS resolver cache
- Capture routing table
- Capture active firewall rules
- Capture listening ports and associated processes
- Hash all network evidence files
Priority 3: Running Processes
- List all processes with full command lines
- List parent-child process relationships (process tree)
- List all loaded modules/DLLs per process
- List all open file handles per process
- List process network connections per PID
- Capture process creation timestamps
- Hash all process evidence files
Priority 4: User Sessions
- List all currently logged-in users
- List active remote sessions (RDP, SSH, SMB)
- List mapped network drives
- Capture recent authentication events
- List active tokens and session keys (if accessible)
Priority 5: System Configuration
- Capture system time and UTC offset
- Export autostart/persistence locations (Registry Run keys, crontab)
- List all services and their states
- Capture environment variables
- List installed software
- Export relevant event log entries
Priority 6: Temporary/Cache Data
- Capture browser history and cache (if relevant)
- Capture clipboard contents (if accessible)
- Capture temp directory contents
- Capture recent file lists
- Capture prefetch files (Windows)
Windows Collection Checklist
[ ] Memory: WinPmem/Magnet RAM Capture
[ ] Processes: tasklist /V, wmic process, Get-Process
[ ] Network: netstat -anob, Get-NetTCPConnection
[ ] Users: query user, net session
[ ] Registry: Run keys, Services, Startup
[ ] Services: sc queryex, Get-Service
[ ] Scheduled Tasks: schtasks /query
[ ] DNS Cache: ipconfig /displaydns
[ ] ARP: arp -a
[ ] Firewall: netsh advfirewall
[ ] Event Logs: wevtutil (Security, System, Application)
[ ] Prefetch: %SystemRoot%\Prefetch\*
[ ] Time: w32tm /query /status
Linux Collection Checklist
[ ] Memory: LiME kernel module or /proc/kcore
[ ] Processes: ps auxwwf, /proc/*/cmdline, /proc/*/maps
[ ] Network: ss -tulnp, /proc/net/tcp, /proc/net/udp
[ ] Users: who, w, last
[ ] Cron: crontab -l, /etc/cron.*
[ ] Services: systemctl list-units
[ ] DNS: systemd-resolve, /etc/resolv.conf
[ ] ARP: ip neigh
[ ] Firewall: iptables -L -n -v, nftables
[ ] Logs: /var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog
[ ] Open Files: lsof
[ ] Time: timedatectl
[ ] Loaded Modules: lsmod
Evidence Integrity Procedures
Hashing Protocol
- Hash EVERY collected file immediately after creation
- Use SHA256 (minimum) - SHA512 preferred for legal cases
- Store hash manifest in separate file
- Verify hashes before and after any transfer
- Include hash in chain of custody documentation
Chain of Custody Requirements
- Record who collected each evidence item
- Record exact time of collection (UTC)
- Record collection method and tool version
- Record any transfer of evidence
- Record storage location and access controls
- Record any analysis performed on copies (never originals)
Common Pitfalls to Avoid
- Running tools from the compromised system's disk
- Forgetting to hash evidence immediately
- Not recording system time offset from UTC
- Installing collection tools on the compromised system
- Rebooting the system before memory collection
- Modifying file timestamps by browsing the filesystem
- Not documenting collection steps in real-time
- Collecting evidence without proper authorization
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