deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection skill (Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills)

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What it does. 'Deploys canary files (honeytokens) across file systems to detect ransomware Part of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills (817 security skills) (mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills).

Upstream mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
Skill file skills/deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection/SKILL.md
License Apache-2.0 (skill folder LICENSE)
Author mukul975
Fetched 2026-09-10

Install

  • npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection, or copy the skill folder into ~/.claude/skills/deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection/.
  • Raw file: curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/HEAD/skills/deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection/SKILL.md

SKILL.md (verbatim)

name: deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection
description: 'Deploys canary files (honeytokens) across file systems to detect ransomware
  encryption activity in real time. Uses strategically placed decoy documents monitored
  via file integrity monitoring or OS-level watchdogs to trigger alerts when ransomware
  modifies or encrypts them. Activates for requests involving ransomware canary deployment,
  honeyfile setup, deception-based ransomware detection, or file integrity monitoring
  for encryption.

  '
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: ransomware-defense
tags:
- ransomware
- detection
- canary-files
- honeytokens
- deception
- file-integrity
version: 1.0.0
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- PR.DS-11
- RS.MA-01
- RC.RP-01
- PR.IR-01
mitre_attack:
- T1486
- T1083
- T1490
- T1485
mitre_f3:
  version: '1.1'
  tactics:
  - monetization
  - positioning
  - stealth
  techniques:
  - id: F1018
    name: Convert to Cryptocurrency
    tactic: monetization
    source: f3
  - id: F1017.001
    name: 'Conversion to Physical Monetary Instruments: Cash'
    tactic: monetization
    source: f3
  - id: T1219
    name: Remote Access Tools
    tactic: positioning
    source: attack
  - id: T1070
    name: Indicator Removal
    tactic: stealth
    source: attack

Deploying Decoy Files for Ransomware Detection

When to Use

  • Setting up early-warning detection for ransomware on file servers or endpoints
  • Supplementing EDR/AV with a deception-based detection layer that catches unknown ransomware variants
  • Creating high-fidelity ransomware alerts that have very low false-positive rates (legitimate users have no reason to touch decoy files)
  • Testing ransomware response procedures by validating that canary file modifications trigger the expected alerting pipeline
  • Protecting high-value file shares (finance, HR, legal) with tripwire files that indicate unauthorized encryption activity

Do not use decoy files as the sole ransomware defense. They are a detection mechanism, not a prevention mechanism, and should complement backups, EDR, and access controls.

Prerequisites

  • Python 3.8+ with watchdog library for cross-platform file system monitoring
  • Administrative access to target file shares or endpoints for canary placement
  • File integrity monitoring (FIM) tool or SIEM integration for alert routing
  • Understanding of target directory structure to place canaries in high-value locations
  • Windows: NTFS change journal or ReadDirectoryChangesW API access
  • Linux: inotify support in kernel (standard in modern kernels)

Workflow

Step 1: Design Canary File Strategy

Plan file placement for maximum detection coverage:

Canary File Placement Strategy:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Naming Convention:
  - Use names that sort FIRST and LAST alphabetically in each directory
  - Ransomware typically enumerates directories A-Z or Z-A
  - Examples: _AAAA_budget_2024.docx, ~zzzz_report_final.xlsx

Placement Locations:
  - Root of every file share (\\server\share\_AAAA_canary.docx)
  - Desktop, Documents, Downloads on each endpoint
  - Department-specific shares (Finance, HR, Legal)
  - Backup staging directories
  - Home directories of high-privilege accounts

File Types:
  - .docx, .xlsx, .pdf (most targeted by ransomware)
  - .sql, .bak (database files, high value)
  - Mix of file types to detect ransomware that targets specific extensions

Step 2: Generate Realistic Canary Files

Create decoy files with realistic content and metadata:

import os
import time

def create_canary_docx(filepath, content="Q4 Financial Summary - Confidential"):
    """Create a realistic .docx canary file using python-docx."""
    from docx import Document
    doc = Document()
    doc.add_heading("Financial Report - CONFIDENTIAL", level=1)
    doc.add_paragraph(content)
    doc.add_paragraph(f"Generated: {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d')}")
    doc.save(filepath)

def create_canary_txt(filepath):
    """Create a simple text canary with known content for hash verification."""
    content = "CANARY_TOKEN_DO_NOT_MODIFY\n"
    content += f"Created: {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S')}\n"
    content += "This file is monitored for unauthorized changes.\n"
    with open(filepath, "w") as f:
        f.write(content)

Step 3: Deploy File System Watcher

Monitor canary files for any modification, rename, or deletion:

from watchdog.observers import Observer
from watchdog.events import FileSystemEventHandler

class CanaryHandler(FileSystemEventHandler):
    def __init__(self, canary_paths, alert_callback):
        self.canary_paths = set(canary_paths)
        self.alert_callback = alert_callback

    def on_modified(self, event):
        if event.src_path in self.canary_paths:
            self.alert_callback("MODIFIED", event.src_path)

    def on_deleted(self, event):
        if event.src_path in self.canary_paths:
            self.alert_callback("DELETED", event.src_path)

    def on_moved(self, event):
        if event.src_path in self.canary_paths:
            self.alert_callback("RENAMED", event.src_path)

Step 4: Configure Alerting and Response

Define automated responses when canary files are triggered:

Alert Response Matrix:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Event: Canary MODIFIED
  → Severity: CRITICAL
  → Action: Alert SOC, identify modifying process (PID), isolate endpoint

Event: Canary DELETED
  → Severity: HIGH
  → Action: Alert SOC, check for ransomware note in same directory

Event: Canary RENAMED (new extension added)
  → Severity: CRITICAL
  → Action: Alert SOC, check extension against known ransomware extensions
  → Automated: Kill modifying process, disable network interface

Event: Multiple canaries triggered within 60 seconds
  → Severity: EMERGENCY
  → Action: Network-wide isolation, activate incident response plan

Step 5: Validate Detection Coverage

Test that canary files detect actual ransomware behavior:

# Simulate ransomware encryption (safe test - modifies canary content)
echo "ENCRYPTED_BY_TEST" > /path/to/canary/_AAAA_budget.docx

# Simulate ransomware rename (adds extension)
mv /path/to/canary/report.xlsx /path/to/canary/report.xlsx.locked

# Verify alerts were generated in SIEM/alerting system

Verification

  • Confirm all canary files are present and unmodified using stored hash baselines
  • Verify that modifying any canary file generates an alert within the expected timeframe (under 30 seconds)
  • Test that alert routing to SOC/SIEM is functional with a controlled modification
  • Validate that automated response actions (process kill, network isolation) execute correctly
  • Check that canary files survive normal backup and restore operations
  • Ensure legitimate users and processes are excluded from false-positive alerts (backup agents, AV scans)

Key Concepts

Term Definition
Canary File A decoy file placed in a directory that is monitored for any access or modification, serving as a tripwire for unauthorized activity
Honeytoken A broader category of deception artifacts (files, credentials, database records) designed to alert when accessed
File Integrity Monitoring Continuous monitoring of file attributes (hash, size, permissions, timestamps) to detect unauthorized changes
ReadDirectoryChangesW Windows API for monitoring file system changes in a directory; used by the watchdog library on Windows
inotify Linux kernel subsystem for monitoring file system events; provides near-instant notification of file changes

Tools & Systems

  • watchdog (Python): Cross-platform file system event monitoring library supporting Windows, Linux, and macOS
  • Canarytokens (Thinkst): Free hosted service for generating various types of canary tokens including files, URLs, and DNS tokens
  • OSSEC/Wazuh: Open-source HIDS with built-in file integrity monitoring and alerting capabilities
  • Elastic Endpoint: Uses canary files internally for ransomware protection and key capture
  • Sysmon: Windows system monitor that logs file creation events (Event ID 11) for canary file monitoring

Other files in this skill

references/api-reference.md (verbatim)

API Reference: Decoy Files for Ransomware Detection

watchdog Library (Python)

Installation

pip install watchdog

Observer Setup

from watchdog.observers import Observer
from watchdog.events import FileSystemEventHandler

observer = Observer()
observer.schedule(handler, path, recursive=True)
observer.start()
observer.join()

Event Types

Event Class Trigger
FileCreatedEvent New file created in watched directory
FileModifiedEvent Existing file content or metadata changed
FileDeletedEvent File removed from watched directory
FileMovedEvent File renamed or moved (src_path, dest_path)
DirCreatedEvent New directory created
DirDeletedEvent Directory removed

Handler Methods

Method Called When
on_created(event) File/directory created
on_modified(event) File/directory modified
on_deleted(event) File/directory deleted
on_moved(event) File/directory renamed/moved
on_any_event(event) Any file system event

Windows ReadDirectoryChangesW API

Monitored Changes

Flag Description
FILE_NOTIFY_CHANGE_FILE_NAME File created, deleted, or renamed
FILE_NOTIFY_CHANGE_DIR_NAME Directory changes
FILE_NOTIFY_CHANGE_SIZE File size changed
FILE_NOTIFY_CHANGE_LAST_WRITE Last write time changed
FILE_NOTIFY_CHANGE_SECURITY Security descriptor changed

Linux inotify Events

Event Masks

Mask Description
IN_MODIFY File was modified
IN_DELETE File was deleted
IN_MOVED_FROM File was renamed (old name)
IN_MOVED_TO File was renamed (new name)
IN_CREATE File was created
IN_ATTRIB Metadata changed

Canarytokens (Thinkst)

Generate Token

URL: https://canarytokens.org/generate
Types: Word document, PDF, DNS, HTTP, AWS key, SQL, SVN

Alert Webhook

POST https://canarytokens.org/webhook
Payload: { "token": "...", "src_ip": "...", "time": "..." }

OSSEC/Wazuh File Integrity Monitoring

Configuration (ossec.conf)

<syscheck>
  <frequency>60</frequency>
  <directories check_all="yes" realtime="yes">/path/to/canaries</directories>
  <alert_new_files>yes</alert_new_files>
</syscheck>

Alert Rule IDs

Rule ID Description
550 File integrity checksum changed
553 File deleted
554 New file added to monitored directory

Sysmon File Monitoring

Event ID 11 - FileCreate

<FileCreate onmatch="include">
  <TargetFilename condition="contains">_AAAA_</TargetFilename>
  <TargetFilename condition="contains">~zzzz_</TargetFilename>
</FileCreate>

Event ID 23 - FileDelete

Logs file deletions including archived file content.

Common Ransomware File Extensions

Extension Family
.locked LockBit, Generic
.encrypted Generic
.wncry WannaCry
.dharma Dharma/CrySiS
.basta Black Basta
.lockbit LockBit 3.0
.conti Conti
.ryuk Ryuk
.revil REvil/Sodinokibi
.akira Akira

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