What it does. Detect Azure service principal abuse in Microsoft Entra ID using KQL detection Part of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills (817 security skills) (mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills).
Install
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse, or copy the skill folder into ~/.claude/skills/detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse/.- Raw file:
curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/HEAD/skills/detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse/SKILL.md
SKILL.md (verbatim)
name: detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse
description: Detect Azure service principal abuse in Microsoft Entra ID using KQL detection
queries (Sentinel/Splunk) against Azure AD Audit and Sign-in Logs, covering added
credentials, privileged role assignment, admin consent bypass, and service principal
enumeration. Use when investigating suspected privilege escalation or persistence
via service principals, or building threat-hunting queries for Entra ID identity
abuse.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: cloud-security
tags:
- azure
- entra-id
- service-principal
- privilege-escalation
- credential-abuse
- detection
- splunk
- sentinel
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques:
- Token Binding
- Restore Access
- Application Protocol Command Analysis
- Reissue Credential
- Network Isolation
nist_csf:
- PR.IR-01
- ID.AM-08
- GV.SC-06
- DE.CM-01
mitre_attack:
- T1078.004
- T1098.001
- T1528
- T1550.001
- T1098.003
Detecting Azure Service Principal Abuse
Overview
Azure service principals are identity objects used by applications, services, and automation tools to access Azure resources. Attackers exploit service principals for privilege escalation, lateral movement, and persistent access. Key abuse patterns include: adding credentials to existing principals, assigning privileged roles, bypassing admin consent, and enumerating service principals for attack paths. Application ownership grants the ability to manage credentials and configure permissions, creating hidden privilege escalation paths.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require detecting azure service principal abuse
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Azure subscription with Microsoft Entra ID P2 license
- Access to Azure AD Audit Logs and Sign-in Logs
- Microsoft Sentinel or Splunk for SIEM-based detection
- Microsoft Graph API permissions for investigation
- Global Reader or Security Reader role minimum
Key Abuse Patterns
1. New Credentials Added to Service Principal
Attackers add new client secrets or certificates to gain persistent access:
Detection Query (KQL - Sentinel):
AuditLogs
| where OperationName has "Add service principal credentials"
or OperationName has "Update application - Certificates and secrets management"
| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend TargetSP = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend TargetSPId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, OperationName, TargetSP, TargetSPId
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
Detection Query (SPL - Splunk):
index=azure sourcetype="azure:aad:audit"
operationName="Add service principal credentials"
OR operationName="Update application*Certificates and secrets*"
| stats count by initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName, targetResources{}.displayName, _time
| sort -_time
2. Privileged Role Assignment to Service Principal
AuditLogs
| where OperationName == "Add member to role"
| extend RoleName = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[1].newValue)
| where RoleName has_any ("Global Administrator", "Application Administrator",
"Privileged Role Administrator", "Cloud Application Administrator")
| extend TargetSP = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, TargetSP, RoleName, OperationName
3. Service Principal Enumeration Detection
MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs
| where RequestMethod == "GET"
| where RequestUri has "/servicePrincipals"
| summarize RequestCount = count() by UserAgent, IPAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where RequestCount > 10
| sort by RequestCount desc
4. Admin Consent Bypass
AuditLogs
| where OperationName == "Consent to application"
| extend ConsentType = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[4].newValue)
| where ConsentType has "AllPrincipals"
| extend AppName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, AppName, ConsentType
5. OAuth App Permissions Escalation
AuditLogs
| where OperationName == "Add app role assignment to service principal"
| extend AppRoleValue = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[1].newValue)
| where AppRoleValue has_any ("RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory",
"Application.ReadWrite.All", "AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All",
"Directory.ReadWrite.All", "Mail.ReadWrite")
| extend TargetApp = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| project TimeGenerated, TargetApp, AppRoleValue, CorrelationId
Investigation Procedures
Step 1: Identify compromised service principal
# List service principals with recently added credentials
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Application.Read.All"
$suspiciousSPs = Get-MgServicePrincipal -All | ForEach-Object {
$sp = $_
$creds = Get-MgServicePrincipalPasswordCredential -ServicePrincipalId $sp.Id
$recentCreds = $creds | Where-Object { $_.StartDateTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) }
if ($recentCreds) {
[PSCustomObject]@{
DisplayName = $sp.DisplayName
AppId = $sp.AppId
ObjectId = $sp.Id
NewCredsCount = $recentCreds.Count
LatestCredAdded = ($recentCreds | Sort-Object StartDateTime -Descending | Select-Object -First 1).StartDateTime
}
}
}
$suspiciousSPs | Sort-Object LatestCredAdded -Descending
Step 2: Review service principal role assignments
# Check role assignments for a specific service principal
$spId = "<service-principal-object-id>"
Get-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment -ServicePrincipalId $spId | ForEach-Object {
$resource = Get-MgServicePrincipal -ServicePrincipalId $_.ResourceId
[PSCustomObject]@{
AppRoleId = $_.AppRoleId
ResourceDisplayName = $resource.DisplayName
CreatedDateTime = $_.CreatedDateTime
}
}
Step 3: Check application ownership
# List owners of all applications (ownership = credential control)
Get-MgApplication -All | ForEach-Object {
$app = $_
$owners = Get-MgApplicationOwner -ApplicationId $app.Id
foreach ($owner in $owners) {
[PSCustomObject]@{
AppName = $app.DisplayName
AppId = $app.AppId
OwnerUPN = $owner.AdditionalProperties.userPrincipalName
OwnerType = $owner.AdditionalProperties.'@odata.type'
}
}
} | Where-Object { $_.OwnerUPN -ne $null }
Step 4: Review sign-in activity
AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
| where ServicePrincipalId == "<target-sp-id>"
| project TimeGenerated, ServicePrincipalName, IPAddress, Location,
ResourceDisplayName, Status.errorCode
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
Preventive Controls
Restrict application registration
# Disable user ability to register applications
Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{
AllowedToCreateApps = $false
}
# Require admin approval for all app consent requests
New-MgPolicyPermissionGrantPolicy -Id "admin-only-consent" `
-DisplayName "Admin Only Consent" `
-Description "Only admins can consent to applications"
Monitor with Microsoft Sentinel Analytics Rules
Create analytics rules for:
- New service principal credential additions
- Privileged role assignments to service principals
- Bulk service principal enumeration
- Admin consent grants to unknown applications
- Service principal sign-ins from unusual locations
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique |
ID |
Description |
| Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials |
T1098.001 |
Adding credentials to service principal |
| Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts |
T1078.004 |
Using compromised service principal |
| Account Discovery: Cloud Account |
T1087.004 |
Enumerating service principals |
| Steal Application Access Token |
T1528 |
OAuth token theft via service principal |
References
- Splunk Detection: Azure AD Service Principal Abuse
- Semperis: Service Principal Ownership Abuse in Entra ID
- MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix
- Microsoft: Securing service principals in Entra ID
Other files in this skill
assets/template.md (verbatim)
Azure Service Principal Abuse Detection Template
Investigation Checklist
| Check |
Status |
Notes |
| Recent credential additions (7 days) |
[ ] |
|
| Privileged role assignments to SPs |
[ ] |
|
| Application ownership review |
[ ] |
|
| Sign-in anomalies for SPs |
[ ] |
|
| Admin consent grants review |
[ ] |
|
| OAuth permission escalation |
[ ] |
|
Affected Service Principals
| Display Name |
App ID |
Object ID |
Finding Type |
Severity |
|
|
|
|
|
| Action |
Status |
Completed By |
Date |
| Rotate compromised credentials |
[ ] |
|
|
| Remove unauthorized role assignments |
[ ] |
|
|
| Disable compromised service principal |
[ ] |
|
|
| Review and restrict app ownership |
[ ] |
|
|
| Enable Conditional Access for workload identities |
[ ] |
|
|
references/api-reference.md (verbatim)
Azure Service Principal Abuse Detection — API Reference
Libraries
| Library |
Install |
Purpose |
| azure-identity |
pip install azure-identity |
Azure AD authentication |
| requests |
pip install requests |
Microsoft Graph API client |
Microsoft Graph API Endpoints
| Method |
Endpoint |
Description |
| GET |
/v1.0/servicePrincipals |
List service principals |
| GET |
/v1.0/servicePrincipals/{id} |
Get SP details and credentials |
| GET |
/v1.0/servicePrincipals/{id}/appRoleAssignments |
SP role assignments |
| GET |
/v1.0/directoryRoles |
List directory roles |
| GET |
/v1.0/directoryRoles/{id}/members |
Role members (includes SPs) |
| GET |
/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns |
Sign-in logs for SP activity |
| GET |
/v1.0/auditLogs/directoryAudits |
Directory change audit logs |
OAuth2 Token Endpoint
POST https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/oauth2/v2.0/token
grant_type=client_credentials
scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default
High-Privilege Directory Roles
| Role |
Risk |
| Global Administrator |
Full tenant control |
| Application Administrator |
Can create/manage all apps |
| Cloud Application Administrator |
Manage cloud app registrations |
| Privileged Role Administrator |
Manage role assignments |
Service Principal Abuse Indicators
| Indicator |
Description |
Severity |
| Multiple password credentials |
Possible backdoor persistence |
HIGH |
| Expired credentials not removed |
Credential hygiene gap |
MEDIUM |
| SP with Global Admin role |
Overprivileged automation |
CRITICAL |
| Unusual sign-in location |
Compromised SP credentials |
HIGH |
| New credential added to SP |
Persistence via credential injection |
CRITICAL |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique |
ID |
Description |
| Account Manipulation |
T1098 |
Add credentials to SP |
| Valid Accounts: Cloud |
T1078.004 |
Abuse SP credentials |
| Trusted Relationship |
T1199 |
Abuse multi-tenant SP trust |
External References
references/standards.md (verbatim)
Standards - Detecting Azure Service Principal Abuse
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
- T1098.001: Account Manipulation - Additional Cloud Credentials
- T1078.004: Valid Accounts - Cloud Accounts
- T1087.004: Account Discovery - Cloud Account
- T1528: Steal Application Access Token
- T1550.001: Use Alternate Authentication Material - Application Access Token
CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark v2.1
- 1.11: Ensure that multi-factor authentication is enabled for all privileged users
- 1.14: Ensure that guest users are reviewed on a regular basis
- 1.15: Ensure that User consent for applications is set to Do not allow user consent
Microsoft Secure Score Recommendations
- Require admin approval for unmanaged applications
- Remove unused application permissions
- Limit service principal credential lifetime
- Implement Conditional Access for workload identities
references/workflows.md (verbatim)
Workflows - Detecting Azure Service Principal Abuse
Detection Workflow
1. Log Collection → Ingest Azure AD Audit + Sign-in logs to SIEM
2. Rule Activation → Enable detection analytics for SP abuse patterns
3. Alert Triage → Validate alerts against known automation accounts
4. Investigation → Correlate credential changes with sign-in anomalies
5. Containment → Disable compromised SP, rotate credentials
6. Remediation → Remove unauthorized permissions, review ownership
Investigation Workflow
1. Identify affected service principal (name, object ID, app ID)
2. Review recent credential changes (new secrets/certificates)
3. Check role assignments for privilege escalation
4. Analyze sign-in logs for unusual IPs/locations
5. Review application ownership chain
6. Assess blast radius of compromised permissions
7. Document findings and initiate incident response
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