implementing-identity-verification-for-zero-trust skill (Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills)
- Install
- SKILL.md (verbatim)
- Prerequisites
- Overview
- When to Use
- Prerequisites
- Architecture
- Identity Verification Flow
- Identity Provider Architecture
- Key Concepts
- Phishing-Resistant MFA
- Continuous Identity Verification
- Risk-Based Conditional Access
- Identity Threat Detection
- Workflow
- Phase 1: Identity Infrastructure
- Phase 2: Risk-Based Authentication
- Phase 3: Continuous Verification
- Phase 4: Identity Governance
- Validation Checklist
- References
- Other files in this skill
- assets/template.md (verbatim)
- Project Information
- Current State Assessment
- Identity Infrastructure
- Current MFA State
- MFA Enrollment Target
- Phishing-Resistant MFA Rollout Plan
- Hardware Key Distribution
- Enrollment Campaign
- Conditional Access Policies
- Risk-Based Policies
- Identity Governance
- Lifecycle Automation
- Access Reviews
- Monitoring and Detection
- Sign-Off
- references/api-reference.md (verbatim)
- CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model - Identity Pillar
- Azure AD Conditional Access API
- FIDO2/WebAuthn Registration
- Conditional Access Signals
- Okta Authentication Policies API
- References
- references/standards.md (verbatim)
- NIST SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture - Identity
- Core Identity Tenets
- Policy Engine Identity Inputs
- NIST SP 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines
- Authentication Assurance Levels (AAL)
- Phishing-Resistant Authenticators
- CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model v2.0 - Identity Pillar
- FIDO Alliance Standards
- FIDO2 / WebAuthn
- Passkeys
- Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) Identity Protection
- Risk Detection Categories
- Continuous Access Evaluation Protocol (CAEP)
- Okta Identity Security
- Okta ThreatInsight
- Okta FastPass
- references/workflows.md (verbatim)
- Workflow 1: Zero Trust Authentication Flow
- Workflow 2: Continuous Access Evaluation
- Workflow 3: FIDO2 Enrollment
- Workflow 4: Compromised Identity Response
What it does. Implements continuous, risk-adaptive identity verification for zero trust Part of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills (817 security skills) (mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills).
| Upstream | mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills |
| Skill file | skills/implementing-identity-verification-for-zero-trust/SKILL.md |
| License | Apache-2.0 (skill folder LICENSE) |
| Author | mukul975 |
| Fetched | 2026-09-10 |
Install
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill implementing-identity-verification-for-zero-trust, or copy the skill folder into~/.claude/skills/implementing-identity-verification-for-zero-trust/.- Raw file:
curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/HEAD/skills/implementing-identity-verification-for-zero-trust/SKILL.md
SKILL.md (verbatim)
name: implementing-identity-verification-for-zero-trust
description: Implements continuous, risk-adaptive identity verification for zero trust
using phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/WebAuthn), risk-based conditional access, and
identity governance aligned with NIST SP 800-207 and the CISA Zero Trust Maturity
Model Identity Pillar. Use when designing zero trust identity controls, deploying
phishing-resistant MFA, or building conditional access policies based on device
posture, behavior, and location.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: zero-trust-architecture
tags:
- zero-trust
- identity
- authentication
- mfa
- identity-verification
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
atlas_techniques:
- AML.T0052
nist_ai_rmf:
- GOVERN-1.1
- GOVERN-1.7
- MAP-1.1
nist_csf:
- PR.AA-01
- PR.AA-05
- PR.IR-01
- GV.PO-01
mitre_attack:
- T1078
- T1190
- T1059
- T1566
- T1598
mitre_f3:
version: '1.1'
tactics:
- initial-access
- positioning
- reconnaissance
techniques:
- id: F1006
name: Account Takeover
tactic: initial-access
source: f3
- id: T1110.004
name: 'Brute Force: Credential Stuffing'
tactic: initial-access
source: attack
- id: T1111
name: Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
tactic: initial-access
source: attack
- id: T1557
name: Adversary-in-the-Middle
tactic: initial-access
source: attack
- id: T1539
name: Steal Web Session Cookie
tactic: positioning
source: attack
- id: T1598
name: Phishing for Information
tactic: reconnaissance
source: attack
Implementing Identity Verification for Zero Trust
Prerequisites
- Understanding of zero trust principles (NIST SP 800-207)
- Familiarity with identity providers (Azure AD, Okta, Ping Identity)
- Knowledge of authentication protocols (SAML 2.0, OIDC, FIDO2)
- Understanding of MFA and passwordless authentication
Overview
Identity is the foundational pillar of zero trust architecture. NIST SP 800-207 mandates that all resource authentication and authorization are dynamic and strictly enforced before access is allowed. Identity verification in zero trust goes beyond traditional username/password by implementing continuous, risk-adaptive authentication using multiple signals including device posture, behavioral biometrics, location, and network context.
This skill covers implementing phishing-resistant MFA, continuous identity verification, risk-based conditional access, and identity governance aligned with the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model Identity Pillar.
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring implementing identity verification for zero trust capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Prerequisites
- Familiarity with zero trust architecture concepts and tools
- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
Architecture
Identity Verification Flow
User Access Request
│
v
┌───────────────────────┐
│ Primary Authentication │
│ - FIDO2/WebAuthn key │
│ - Certificate-based │
│ - Passwordless │
└──────────┬────────────┘
v
┌───────────────────────┐
│ Contextual Assessment │
│ - Device posture │
│ - Network location │
│ - Geo-velocity check │
│ - Time of access │
│ - Behavioral baseline │
└──────────┬────────────┘
v
┌───────────────────────┐
│ Risk Scoring Engine │
│ - Aggregate signals │
│ - Calculate risk score │
│ - Compare to threshold │
└───┬──────────┬────────┘
│ │
Low Risk High Risk
│ │
v v
┌────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ Grant │ │ Step-up Auth │
│ Access │ │ - Hardware key│
│ │ │ - Biometric │
│ │ │ - Manager OK │
└────────┘ └──────────────┘
Identity Provider Architecture
- Primary IdP: Azure AD / Okta / Ping Identity for centralized identity management
- FIDO2 Authenticators: Hardware security keys (YubiKey) or platform authenticators (Windows Hello, Touch ID)
- Risk Engine: Adaptive access using identity threat detection (Microsoft Entra ID Protection, Okta ThreatInsight)
- Identity Governance: Lifecycle management, access reviews, just-in-time provisioning
- Privileged Identity: Separate verification for elevated access (CyberArk, BeyondTrust)
Key Concepts
Phishing-Resistant MFA
FIDO2/WebAuthn eliminates phishable credentials by binding authentication to the origin domain. Hardware security keys and platform authenticators provide cryptographic proof of identity without transmitting secrets.
Continuous Identity Verification
Rather than authenticating once at session start, zero trust requires ongoing verification through session token evaluation, behavioral analytics, and periodic re-authentication challenges based on risk signals.
Risk-Based Conditional Access
Conditional access policies evaluate multiple signals (user risk level, sign-in risk, device compliance, location) to dynamically adjust authentication requirements and access grants.
Identity Threat Detection
AI-driven analytics detect compromised identities through impossible travel detection, anomalous sign-in patterns, credential stuffing detection, and token replay attacks.
Workflow
Phase 1: Identity Infrastructure
Consolidate Identity Providers
- Audit all identity sources across the organization
- Federate to a single authoritative IdP using SAML 2.0 or OIDC
- Configure SCIM for automated provisioning and deprovisioning
- Eliminate local accounts and shared credentials
Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA
- Enroll all users in FIDO2/WebAuthn with hardware security keys
- Configure platform authenticators (Windows Hello for Business, macOS Touch ID)
- Disable SMS and voice call as MFA methods (phishable)
- Create conditional access policy requiring phishing-resistant methods for all sign-ins
Configure Conditional Access Policies
- Require compliant device for access to sensitive applications
- Block legacy authentication protocols (basic auth, IMAP, POP3)
- Require MFA for all users from untrusted locations
- Enforce session time limits with re-authentication
- Block or require additional verification for high-risk sign-ins
Phase 2: Risk-Based Authentication
Enable Identity Threat Detection
- Activate Microsoft Entra ID Protection or Okta ThreatInsight
- Configure risk levels: low (allow), medium (require MFA), high (block and investigate)
- Enable impossible travel detection and anomalous token alerts
- Integrate identity risk signals with SIEM/SOAR
Implement Step-Up Authentication
- For sensitive operations (privilege elevation, financial transactions), require additional verification
- Configure step-up policies: re-authenticate with hardware key
- Integrate with PAM for privileged session approval workflows
- Log all step-up events for audit trail
Phase 3: Continuous Verification
Deploy Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE)
- Enable Continuous Access Evaluation Protocol (CAEP) for real-time token revocation
- Configure critical event triggers: user disabled, password changed, location change
- Test that token revocation occurs within minutes (not hours) of security event
- Monitor CAE event logs for operational health
Implement Session Controls
- Configure session duration limits based on application sensitivity
- Enable sign-in frequency controls (re-authenticate every N hours)
- Implement persistent browser session controls
- Configure app-enforced restrictions for unmanaged devices
Phase 4: Identity Governance
Automate Identity Lifecycle
- Configure joiner-mover-leaver workflows with HR system integration
- Automate access provisioning based on role and department
- Enable just-in-time access for temporary elevated permissions
- Configure automatic access expiration for contractors and guests
Implement Access Reviews
- Schedule quarterly access certification campaigns
- Configure automated reminders and escalation
- Require manager approval for continued access
- Auto-revoke access for unreviewed certifications
Validation Checklist
- Single authoritative IdP with all applications federated
- FIDO2/WebAuthn enrolled for all users
- SMS and voice MFA methods disabled
- Legacy authentication protocols blocked
- Conditional access policies enforced for all applications
- Identity threat detection active with risk-based policies
- Continuous Access Evaluation enabled and tested
- Step-up authentication configured for sensitive operations
- Identity lifecycle automated with HR integration
- Quarterly access reviews scheduled and operational
- Identity events streaming to SIEM
References
- NIST SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture
- NIST SP 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines - Authentication
- CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model v2.0 - Identity Pillar
- FIDO Alliance WebAuthn Specification
- Microsoft Entra Conditional Access Documentation
Other files in this skill
- LICENSE
- assets/template.md
- references/api-reference.md
- references/standards.md
- references/workflows.md
- scripts/agent.py
- scripts/process.py
assets/template.md (verbatim)
Identity Verification Implementation Plan Template
Project Information
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Project Name | |
| Organization | |
| Identity Provider | [Azure AD / Okta / Ping Identity] |
| User Population | |
| Target Completion |
Current State Assessment
Identity Infrastructure
- Primary IdP: |
- Secondary IdPs: |
- Local Accounts: [Count and locations] |
- Shared Accounts: [Count - target for elimination] |
Current MFA State
| Method | Enabled | Users Enrolled | Phishing-Resistant |
|---|---|---|---|
| SMS OTP | No | ||
| Voice Call | No | ||
| TOTP App | No | ||
| Push Notification | No | ||
| FIDO2 Security Key | Yes | ||
| Windows Hello | Yes | ||
| Certificate/PIV | Yes |
MFA Enrollment Target
- Current enrollment rate: ___%
- Target enrollment rate: 100%
- Phishing-resistant target: 100%
Phishing-Resistant MFA Rollout Plan
Hardware Key Distribution
| User Group | Key Type | Quantity | Distribution Method | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Executive Leadership | YubiKey 5 NFC | In-person | Week 1 | |
| IT Administrators | YubiKey 5C | IT distribution | Week 2 | |
| All Employees | YubiKey Security Key | Self-service + mail | Weeks 3-8 |
Enrollment Campaign
- Communication sent to all users
- Self-service portal configured
- Help desk trained on enrollment support
- Enrollment deadline set: ____
- Escalation path for non-compliant users
Conditional Access Policies
| Policy Name | Users | Apps | Conditions | Grant Controls | Session Controls |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Block Legacy Auth | All | All | Legacy clients | Block | N/A |
| Require MFA | All | All | Any | Require MFA | Sign-in freq: 8hr |
| Require Compliant Device | All | Sensitive Apps | Any | Compliant device | App enforced |
| Block Risky Sign-In | All | All | High sign-in risk | Block | N/A |
| Require FIDO2 for Admins | Admin roles | Admin portals | Any | FIDO2 only | 1hr frequency |
Risk-Based Policies
| Risk Level | User Risk Response | Sign-In Risk Response |
|---|---|---|
| Low | Allow | Allow |
| Medium | Require MFA step-up | Require MFA step-up |
| High | Block + alert SOC | Block + alert SOC |
Identity Governance
Lifecycle Automation
- HR system integrated for joiner/mover/leaver
- Automatic provisioning on hire
- Role change triggers access review
- Automatic deprovisioning on termination
- Contractor access expiration configured
Access Reviews
- Frequency: Quarterly
- Scope: All application assignments
- Reviewers: Direct managers
- Auto-action on non-response: Revoke access
Monitoring and Detection
| Capability | Tool | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Sign-in log analysis | SIEM (Splunk/Sentinel) | |
| Identity threat detection | Entra ID Protection / ThreatInsight | |
| Impossible travel detection | IdP + UEBA | |
| Continuous Access Evaluation | CAE/CAEP | |
| Behavioral analytics | UEBA platform |
Sign-Off
| Stakeholder | Role | Approval | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CISO | |||
| Identity Team Lead | |||
| Help Desk Manager | |||
| HR Systems |
references/api-reference.md (verbatim)
API Reference: Implementing Identity Verification for Zero Trust
CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model - Identity Pillar
| Level | Description | Requirements |
|---|---|---|
| Traditional | Password-based, static policies | Basic auth |
| Initial | MFA deployed, basic conditional access | MFA for all users |
| Advanced | Phishing-resistant MFA, risk-based | FIDO2, risk signals |
| Optimal | Continuous verification, passwordless | Behavioral analytics |
Azure AD Conditional Access API
import requests
headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer <token>"}
policies = requests.get(
"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies",
headers=headers).json()
FIDO2/WebAuthn Registration
const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({
publicKey: {
rp: { name: "Example Corp" },
user: { id: userId, name: email, displayName: name },
challenge: serverChallenge,
pubKeyCredParams: [{ type: "public-key", alg: -7 }],
authenticatorSelection: { residentKey: "required" },
}
});
Conditional Access Signals
| Signal | Source | Zero Trust Level |
|---|---|---|
| Device compliance | MDM/Intune | Initial |
| Location/IP | Network context | Initial |
| User risk | Identity Protection | Advanced |
| Sign-in risk | Real-time analysis | Advanced |
| Session behavior | UEBA | Optimal |
Okta Authentication Policies API
curl -X GET "https://DOMAIN.okta.com/api/v1/policies?type=ACCESS_POLICY" \
-H "Authorization: SSWS <token>"
References
- CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model: https://www.cisa.gov/zero-trust-maturity-model
- NIST SP 800-207: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/207/final
- FIDO Alliance: https://fidoalliance.org/fido2/
references/standards.md (verbatim)
Standards and Frameworks Reference
NIST SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture - Identity
Core Identity Tenets
- All resource authentication and authorization are dynamic and strictly enforced before access is allowed
- The enterprise collects as much information as possible about the current state of assets, network infrastructure, and communications and uses it to improve its security posture
- Access decisions should consider behavioral attributes, environmental attributes, and the identity of the requester
Policy Engine Identity Inputs
The Policy Engine (PE) uses the following identity-related inputs:
- User identity and attributes from the IdP
- Device identity and posture from the endpoint management system
- Behavioral attributes from user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA)
- Environmental attributes (location, time, network)
NIST SP 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines
Authentication Assurance Levels (AAL)
| AAL | Description | Methods | Zero Trust Mapping |
|---|---|---|---|
| AAL1 | Some assurance | Single-factor (password) | Insufficient for ZT |
| AAL2 | High confidence | Multi-factor (push notification, OTP) | Minimum for ZT |
| AAL3 | Very high confidence | Hardware-based (FIDO2, PIV card) | Target for ZT |
Phishing-Resistant Authenticators
- FIDO2/WebAuthn: Cryptographic authentication bound to origin domain
- PIV/CAC smart cards: Certificate-based authentication
- Not phishing-resistant: SMS OTP, voice calls, push notifications, TOTP
CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model v2.0 - Identity Pillar
| Maturity Level | Authentication | Identity Store | Risk Assessment | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional | Password + basic MFA | Multiple disconnected stores | None | Basic audit logs |
| Initial | MFA for all users | Federated IdP | Static risk rules | Centralized auth logs |
| Advanced | Phishing-resistant MFA | Single authoritative IdP with SCIM | Risk-based conditional access | Identity analytics |
| Optimal | Continuous verification | Automated lifecycle governance | AI-driven threat detection | Real-time UEBA |
FIDO Alliance Standards
FIDO2 / WebAuthn
- W3C Web Authentication specification for passwordless authentication
- Public-key cryptography: private key never leaves the authenticator
- Origin-bound: authentication is cryptographically tied to the service domain
- Resistant to phishing, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks
Passkeys
- Evolution of FIDO2 for consumer and enterprise use
- Synced across devices via platform credential managers (iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager)
- Discoverable credentials eliminate need to remember usernames
Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) Identity Protection
Risk Detection Categories
| Risk Type | Detection | Response |
|---|---|---|
| Anonymous IP | Sign-in from anonymous proxy/VPN | Require MFA |
| Atypical travel | Impossible travel between sign-in locations | Block + investigate |
| Malware-linked IP | Sign-in from known malicious IP | Block |
| Unfamiliar sign-in | Unusual sign-in properties | Step-up auth |
| Leaked credentials | Credentials found in dark web dumps | Force password reset |
| Token anomaly | Unusual token characteristics | Revoke session |
Continuous Access Evaluation Protocol (CAEP)
- Real-time token revocation on security events
- Critical events: user disabled, password changed, high risk detected
- Reduces token lifetime gap from hours to near real-time
- Supported by Microsoft 365, Exchange Online, SharePoint Online
Okta Identity Security
Okta ThreatInsight
- Pre-authentication threat detection using IP reputation
- Credential stuffing protection
- Bot detection and rate limiting
- Anomalous location and device detection
Okta FastPass
- Passwordless, phishing-resistant authentication
- Device-bound biometric verification
- Continuous device trust assessment
- No shared secrets transmitted over network
references/workflows.md (verbatim)
Identity Verification Workflows
Workflow 1: Zero Trust Authentication Flow
User Initiates Access
│
v
┌─────────────────────────┐
│ 1. Pre-Authentication │
│ - Check IP reputation │
│ - Rate limit evaluation │
│ - Bot detection │
│ - Geo-blocking check │
└──────────┬──────────────┘
v
┌─────────────────────────┐
│ 2. Primary Authentication│
│ - FIDO2 key challenge │
│ - Biometric verification │
│ - Certificate validation │
│ - Passwordless flow │
└──────────┬──────────────┘
v
┌─────────────────────────┐
│ 3. Context Assessment │
│ - Device compliance │
│ - Network location │
│ - Time of access │
│ - Behavioral baseline │
│ - Previous session state │
└──────────┬──────────────┘
v
┌─────────────────────────┐
│ 4. Risk Calculation │
│ - User risk level │
│ - Sign-in risk level │
│ - Aggregate score │
└───┬──────────┬──────┬───┘
│ │ │
LOW MED HIGH
│ │ │
v v v
┌──────┐ ┌────────┐ ┌────────┐
│Grant │ │Step-Up │ │Block + │
│Token │ │ Auth │ │Alert │
└──────┘ └────────┘ └────────┘
Workflow 2: Continuous Access Evaluation
Active Session
│
v
┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ Continuous Monitoring Loop │
│ │
│ ┌─── Check every N minutes ──┐
│ │ │
│ │ ┌─────────────────────┐ │
│ │ │ Signal Collection │ │
│ │ │ - Device compliance │ │
│ │ │ - User risk change │ │
│ │ │ - Location shift │ │
│ │ │ - Behavior anomaly │ │
│ │ └──────────┬──────────┘ │
│ │ v │
│ │ ┌─────────────────────┐ │
│ │ │ Critical Events │ │
│ │ │ - Account disabled │ │
│ │ │ - Password changed │ │
│ │ │ - MFA registration │ │
│ │ │ - Admin revocation │ │
│ │ └──────────┬──────────┘ │
│ │ v │
│ │ ┌─────────────────────┐ │
│ │ │ Re-Evaluate Access │ │
│ │ │ - Recalculate risk │ │
│ │ │ - Apply policy │ │
│ │ └───┬─────────┬───────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │
│ │ Continue Revoke │
│ │ Session Token │
│ └──────┘ │ │
│ v │
│ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ Force Re-Auth│ │
│ │ or Terminate │ │
│ └──────────────┘ │
└──────────────────────────────┘
Workflow 3: FIDO2 Enrollment
Admin Initiates Enrollment Campaign
│
v
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ 1. User Notification │
│ - Email with instructions │
│ - Self-service portal URL │
│ - Deadline for enrollment │
└──────────┬───────────────┘
v
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ 2. User Self-Service │
│ - Authenticate with │
│ existing credentials │
│ - Register security key │
│ (YubiKey, Titan key) │
│ - Register platform auth │
│ (Windows Hello, TouchID)│
│ - Register backup method │
└──────────┬───────────────┘
v
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ 3. Verification │
│ - Test sign-in with FIDO2 │
│ - Confirm backup works │
│ - Record key serial/ID │
└──────────┬───────────────┘
v
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ 4. Policy Enforcement │
│ - Enable phishing-resist │
│ conditional access │
│ - Disable legacy MFA │
│ - Monitor compliance rate │
└──────────────────────────┘
Workflow 4: Compromised Identity Response
Identity Threat Detected
│
v
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ 1. Detection Signal │
│ - Impossible travel │
│ - Leaked credentials │
│ - Token anomaly │
│ - Behavioral deviation │
└──────────┬───────────────┘
v
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ 2. Automated Response │
│ - Revoke all sessions │
│ - Disable account │
│ - Trigger SOAR playbook │
│ - Notify SOC analyst │
└──────────┬───────────────┘
v
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ 3. Investigation │
│ - Review sign-in logs │
│ - Check accessed resources│
│ - Correlate with EDR data │
│ - Interview user │
└──────────┬───────────────┘
v
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ 4. Remediation │
│ - Reset all credentials │
│ - Re-enroll FIDO2 keys │
│ - Review and restrict │
│ access permissions │
│ - Re-enable account │
│ - Update detection rules │
└──────────────────────────┘
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